

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AIR MANPOWER: WG STUDY OF US PROPOSALS

REF: A. USNATO 489 B. USNATO 341 C. STATE 22964 D. STATE 22970

1. WE TRANSMIT BELOW REVISED DRAFT WG PAPER ON US AIR MANPOWER PROPOSALS, WHICH WG STAFF PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO DISCUSSION AT JANUARY 28 WG MEETING. WG WILL CONSIDER THIS DRAFT AT FEBRUARY 11 MEETING.

2. PRINCIPAL CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS DRAFT (REFB) ARE:

(A) REORGANIZATION AND EXPANSION OF PAPER TO ACCOMMODATE REQUESTS OF NETHERLANDS, UK, AND FRG REPS FOR ANALYSIS OF IMPLICATIONS OF US PROPOSALS FOR PHASE II.

(B) ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS IN PARA 7 OF EFFECT OF VARIOUS

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PERCENTAGE CUTS IN US AIR MANPOWER. (SHAPE AND STAFF GROUP

PROMOTED THIS SECTION.)

(C) PARA 8 ANALYSIS OF ADDITIONAL US GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS
(UK PROPOSAL).

3. AT REQUEST OF MISSION OFFICER, ACTING CHAIRMAN, BEFORE CIRCULATING THIS DRAFT DELETED PASSAGE SAYING, WITH RESPECT TO LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 7, THAT "CONSULTATIONS WITH US AUTHORITIES CONTINUE IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY SUCH CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND TO ESTABLISH WHETHER HIGH PRIORITY COULD BE GIVEN TO THEIR RE-INSTATEMENT." MISSION OFFICER EXPRESSED CONCERN THIS PHRASE COULD LEAD TO REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL STUDIES. ACTING CHAIRMAN BELIEVED OTHER REPS WOULD RETURN TO THIS POINT. HE SAID SOME ALLIES ARE CONCERNED ABOUT EFFECT ON COMBAT CAPABILITY OF AIR MANPOWER CUTS AT 15 PERCENT LEVEL. HE MAINTAINS ADDITIONAL US INFORMATION AND ASSURANCE ON THIS POINT WOULD EXPEDITE ACCEPTANCE OF US PROPOSALS.

4. ACTING CHAIRMAN ALSO DELETED AT MISSION OFFICER'S REQUEST SENTENCE AT END OF PARA 7 STATING "SIMILARLY, FURTHER CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO CONTINGENCY PLANS (E.G. AMF) OF WITHDRAWAL OF C130 AIRCRAFT AND MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP." ACTING CHAIRMAN SAID TURK REP HAD QUESTIONED HIM AT LENGTH ON EFFECT OF US PROPOSALS ON FLANKS. HE THOUGHT TURKS MIGHT WEIGH IN ON FLANK CONCERNS IN FINAL STAGES OF CONSIDERATION OF US PROPOSALS. ACTING CHAIRMAN BELIEVED RESPONSE TO FOLLOWING QUESTION WOULD HELP HIM SATISFY FLANK CONCERNS: WITH RESPECT TO 15 PERCENT REDUCTION, WOULD RELOCATION OF TACTICAL AIRLIFT UNIT OR REDUCTIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS AREA REDUCE US CONTRIBUTION TO ACE MOBLILE FORCE (A) IN COMBAT UNITS, OR (B) IN COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT? IF SO, WOULD THIS DELAY US RESPONSE TO AMF DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS? DOES US ENVISAGE AMF TACTICAL AIRLIFT OR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES SHOULD BE REINSTATED BY OTHER ALLIES (E.G. UK OR BELGIUM)?

5. COMMENT: MISSION WILL CIRCULATE HELPFUL RESPONSES IN REFS C AND D TO WG REPS FEBRUARY 3. THESE RESPONSES, PLUS WASHINGTON COMMENT ON NEW DRAFT OF PAPER, WILL PUT US IN STRONG POSITION AT FEBRUARY 11 MEETING TO PRESS FOR RAPID PROGRESS ON MILITARY TECHNICAL STUDY OF US AIR MANPOWER PROPOSALS.

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6. ACTION REQUESTED: BY FEBRUARY 10, WASHINGTON COMMENT ON NEW DRAFT AND POINTS IN PARAS 2 AND 3 ABOVE.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF NEW DRAFT:

B. US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO INCLUDE AT LEAST 15 PERCENT OF US AND OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER

IN THE NGA. SOVIET GROUND REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSIST OF A TANK ARMY OF ABOUT 68,000 GROUND PERSONNEL AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

C. THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO INCLUDE SOME AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN ITS PHASE I REDUCTIONS DESCRIBED IN PARA A. ABOVE. THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF THE MANPOWER REDUCTION PERCENTAGES WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DETERMINATION IN A LATER POINT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO PHASE II ARE:

A. TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN A COMBINED (GROUND PLUS AIR) COMMON CEILING. THIS MEANS THAT THE ULTIMATE RESULT OF REDUCTIONS IN BOTH PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE AN EQUAL TOTAL LEVEL (NUMBER) OF GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES. THE COMBINED (GROUND PLUS AIR) COMMON CEILING WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURE OF 900,000 MEN.

B. THE US INTENDS TO ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS UNLESS THE ALLIES THEMSELVES DECIDE TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. THE US WILL NOT PRESS ANY ALLY TO INCLUDE AIR PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II AND WILL SUPPORT ANY ALLY IF IT DECIDES NOT TO INCLUDE REDUCTIONS OF ITS AIR PERSONNEL. THE US DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS APPROACH CREATES ANY PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II OTHER THAN OPTIONAL INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS MADE BY INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO PHASE I

4. FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF THE US PROPOSAL, THE FOLLOWING MANPOWER STRENGTHS OF NATO AND WP
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ARE USED (1):

	NATO		WP
US AIR	34,000	SOV AIR	65,000
NON-US AIR	162,000	NSWP AIR	143,000
TOTAL AIR	196,000		208,000
US GROUND	193,000	SOVIET GRD	479,000
NON-US GROUND	597,000	NSWP GRD	458,000
TOTAL GROUND	790,000		937,000
TOTAL FORCES	986,000	TOTAL FORCES	1,145,000

5. THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF THE US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO PHASE I ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. TOTAL AIR AND GROUND FORCES TO BE REDUCED BY EACH SIDE
(15 PERCENT OF AIR PLUS GROUND MANPOWER):

(1) THE NATO FIGURES ARE THOSE CONTAINED IN AC/276(SGDS)-/29 FOR
END 1974; WP FIGURES ARE THOSE THOWN IN MCM-86-74, FOR MID 74
ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST THOUSAND

	US		SOVIET
AIR	34,000	AIR	65,000
GROUND	193,000	GROUND	479,000

15 PERCENT X 227,000 EQUALS 34,050 15 PERCENT X 544,000 EQUALS 81,600

B. THE ABOVE TOTAL AIR PLUS GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS MUST
INCLUDE GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF AT LEAST 15 PERCENT OF US
AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA. REQUIRED GROUND
FORCES REDUCTIONS MUST BE AT LEAST:

	US		SOVIET
	15 PERCENT X 193,000 EQUALS 28,950		15 PERCENT X 479,000

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EQUALS 71,850

C. UNDER THE PROPOSAL THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO REDUCE
SOME AIR MANPOWER (NOT EXCEEDING 15 PERCENT OF US AIR MANPOWER
IN THE NGA) IN ORDER TO REACH THE REQUIRED TOTAL OF AIR PLUS
GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF 34,050. US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS
COULD AMOUNT TO AS MUCH AS 5,100. AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FOR
THE SOVIETS COULD VARY FROM NONE UP TO 9,750. THE EXACT
COMPOSITION OF THE MANPOWER REDUCTION PERCENTAGES WOULD BE A
MATTER FOR DETERMINATION IN A LATER POINT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

D. THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWS THE NUMBER OF AIR AND GROUND
MANPOWER PERSONNEL EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ASSUMING
REDUCTIONS OF AIR MANPOWER, FOR BOTH SIDES, RANGING FROM ZERO
THROUGH 5 PERCENT AND 10 PERCENT TO A MAXIMUM OF 15 PERCENT.

	US REDUCTIONS		SOVIET REDUCTIONS	
	AIR	GROUND	AIR	GROUND
0 PERCENT	0	34,050	-	81,600
5 PERCENT	1,700	32,350	3,250	78,350
10 PERCENT	3,400	30,650	6,500	75,100
15 PERCENT	5,100	28,950	9,750	71,850

E. THE GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS SHOWN IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH
EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF US OR SOVIET
GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA ARE:

US	SOVIET
34,050 EQUALS 17.6 PERCENT	81,600 EQUALS 17.0 PERCENT
32,350 EQUALS 16.8 PERCENT	78,350 EQUALS 16.4 PERCENT
30,650 EQUALS 15.9 PERCENT	75,100 EQUALS 15.7 PERCENT
28,950 EQUALS 15.0 PERCENT	71,950 EQUALS 15.0 PERCENT

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OTHER MILITARY/TECHNICAL EFFECTS WITH RESPECT TO PHASE I

6. THE US AUTHORITIES HAVE EXAMINED THE EFFECTS, FOR THEIR AIR
FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA, OF REDUCTIONS IN MANPOWER AT
5 PERCENT, 10 PERCENT AND 15 PERCENT. THE US FIND THAT NONE OF
THESE WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

A. A 5 PERCENT REDUCTION WOULD NOT AFFECT COMBAT CAPABILITY.

B. AT 10 PERCENT THE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD BEGIN TO BEAR BUT WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON M-DAY AVAILABILITY OF TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, SORTIE RATES, OR INITIAL DEFENCE AND RECEPTION CAPABILITIES. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS WOULD BE A MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, WHICH COULD BE RETURNED BY MPLUS3 IF REQUIRED.

C. REDUCTIONS AT 15 PERCENT, ALTHOUGH NOT AFFECTING TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT NUMBERS, WOULD INVOLVE SOME DEGRADATION OF RESPONSIVENESS AND SUPERVISION IN THE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
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AREA. OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND READINESS WOULD BE REDUCED AT M-DAY AND RECEPTION CAPABILITY WOULD BE DEGRADED. DEPENDING UPON DEPLOYMENT PHASING, PERSONNEL AND AIRCRAFT COULD BE RETURNED PRIOR TO M-23. A CRITICAL FACTOR IN THIS CASE (AS WELL AS IN A 10 PERCENT REDUCTION) WOULD BE RELIANCE ON ADEQUATE WARNING TIME. IF THE WARSAW PACT ATTACK COMMENCES PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF FORCES REQUIRED TO REPLACE WITHDRAWN AIR MANPOWER, INITIAL COMBAT CAPABILITY OF IN-PLACE FORCES COULD BE OVER-EXTENDED. RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY OF NGA TACTICAL UNITS TO A CRISIS AREA IN USAF, BUT OUTSIDE THE NGA, COULD ALSO BE DEGRADED DUE TO THE RELOCATION OF TACTICAL AIRLIFT AND REDUCTION IN MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT THAT MIGHT OCCUR AT A 15PERCENT REDUCTION LEVEL.

7. US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AT 5PERCENT COULD BE MADE IN THOSE SUPPORT AREAS THAT ARE ALREADY PROGRAMMED FOR REDUCTION TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY AND FOR ECONOMY REASONS. THE EFFECTS ON US AIR POSTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ON THE ALLIANCE WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT. A 10PERCENT REDUCTION WOULD INVOLVE FURTHER THIN-OUT OF MANNING LEVELS. ADDITIONALLY, WITHDRAWAL OF A MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP WOULD BE ENTAILED: THIS COULD BE RETURNED BY M PLUS 3 IF REQUIRED. THE THIN-OUT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE US OPERATIONAL OR READINESS POSTURE TO ANY SIGNIFICANT EXTENT. THERE WOULD BE SOME REDUCTION IN RESPONSIVENESS IN COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS AREA, WHICH COULD BE MADE GOOD AT SHORT NOTICE. AT THE 15PERCENT LEVEL, AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD BEAR MORE HEAVILY (SEE PARA 6 ABOVE) AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWN MEN AND UNITS MIGHT NOT BE EFFECTED BEFORE MPLUS 23. IF ANY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AFFECTING COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE EARLY STAGES OF WAR WERE INCLUDED IN THIS PACKAGE IT COULD BE UNDESIRABLE TO DELAY THE RETURN OF SUCH ELEMENTS UNTIL MPLUS 23.

8. AS SHOWN IN PARA 5B. US GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS MUST BE AT LEAST 28,950 IN PHASE I. HOWEVER, THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF US AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTION PERCENTAGES WOULD BE DETERMINED LATER (SEE PARA 2C.). THUS, US GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FOR PHASE I COULD EXCEED THE CURRENT NATO

PROPOSAL OF 29,000 BY UP TO A THEORETICAL MAXIMUM OF 5,050 MEN (ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO A BRIGADE SIZE UNIT). WHETHER SUCH POSSIBLE, ADDITIONAL US GROUND FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A "THIN-OUT".

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OR WOULD REQUIRE REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF PEACETIME COMBAT OR COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS CAN ONLY BE ASSESSED BY THE US. WHICHEVER METHOD IS FINALLY ADOPTED, IT COULD BE OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE THAT THE COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF ANY WITHDRAWN UNITS OR PERSONNEL SHOULD BE PREPOSITIONED OR STOCKPILED, AT HIGH READINESS, IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR RAPID RE-ACTIVATION IN EMERGENCY. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED, THAT THE US ARE CURRENTLY INCREASING THE NUMBER OF COMBAT BRIGADES IN THE FRG BY TWO, THROUGH RESTRUCTURING OF EXISTING RESOURCES.) THE ALLIES, FROM THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT, WOULD WISH TO SELECT AN "OPTIMUM MIX" BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTION PERCENTAGES THAT WOULD HAVE THE LEAST IMPACT ON OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITY OF US FORCES IN EUROPE. THE EXACT COMPARISON OF THE MANPOWER REDUCTION PACKAGE COULD ONLY BE DETERMINED AT A LATER POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. UNDER THE US PROPOSAL THE USSR WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACCEPT LARGER REDUCTIONS THAN HITHERTO ENVISAGED.

9. WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD ELECT TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I IS NOT KNOWN NOR, IF THE SOVIETS CHOSE TO REDUCE AIRMANPOWER, TO WHAT EXTENT, EXCEPT THAT UNDER THE US PROPOSAL SUCH REDUCTIONS COULD NOT BE MORE THAN 9,750. HOWEVER, THE VARIOUS OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIETS FOR REDUCING AIR MANPOWER, IF THEY CHOSE TO DO SO, ARE READILY APPARENT WHEN ONE EXAMINES A BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOER IN THE NGA.

A. NATO ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA ARE:

CATEGORY	NUMBER
-----	-----
COMMAND AND HQ STAFF	4,920
FLYING UNITS:	39,310
COMBAT	(27,920)
HELICOPTER	(10,000)
TRANSPORT	(1,390)
AIR DEFENCE:	6,690
SUPPORT:	13,910

TOTAL	64,830

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B. THE SOVIETS COULD EFFECT REDUCTIONS BY A "THIN-OUT", BY WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS, OR A COMBINATION OF "THIN-OUT" AND UNIT WITHDRAWALS. THESE OPTIONS COULD BE APPLIED IN ANY COMBINATION TO THE ABOVE LISTED CATEGORIES OF SOVIET AIR MANPOWER IN THE NGA. SOVIET REDUCTIONS TAKEN IN COMMAND AND HQ STAFF OR IN SUPPORT PERSONNEL MIGHT IMPACT LESS ON OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY THAN REDUCTIONS TAKEN IN FLYING UNITS OR AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS MIGHT CONSIDER THAT THE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COMMAND AND HQ STAFFS AND TO SUPPORT ARE MINIMAL AND ESSENTIAL FOR CONTINUED EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS OF RESIDUAL SOVIET AIR FORCES IN THE NGA. IN SUCH CASE, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO LOOK TO THEIR FLYING UNITS OR AIR DEFENCE FOR REDUCTIONS.

C. IN ANY EVENT, IT IS PROBABLE THAT, IF THE SOVIETS CHOSE TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER, THEY WOULD DO SO IN THE WAY BEST

SUITED TO THEIR PURPOSE AND LEAST DEGRADING IN OPERATIONAL EFFECTS. IN VIEW OF THE PROXIMITY OF SOVIET TERRITORY TO THE REDUCTION AREA, IT IS AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY THAT THE
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USSR WOULD PREFER TO WITHDRAW SLECTED AIR UNITS TO THE THREE WMDS, RATHER THAN BEAR A MANPOWER REDUCTION WHICH COULD REDUCE READINESS AND CAPABILITY THROUGHOUT THEIR AIR FORCES IN THE NGA. AIR UNITS SO WITHDRAWN COUL BE RAPIDLY REINTRODUCED IN EMERGENCY. PROVIDED THE NECESSARY GROUND SUPPORT FACILITIES REMAINED AVAILABLE IN THE NGA.

10. AS STATED IN A PREVIOUS REPORT (AC/276-D(74)9), THE WARSAW PACT (INCLUDING SOVIET) AIRCRAFT TO MANPOWER RATIO IS HIGH. THIS IS DUE, AT LEAST IN LARGE PART, TO THE WP PRACTICE OF USING GROUND FORCES TO PROVIDE SOME GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT SERVICES FOR THEIR AIR FORCES. SOVIET AIR MANPOWER IN THEIR AIR FORCE IN THE NGA IS ENGAGED IN OPERATION AND IMMEDIATE GROUND CONTROL AND SUPPORT OF AIRCRAFT. IT IS THEREFORE PROBABLE THAT REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET AIR MANPOWER WOULD BEAR DIRECTLY (TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN FOR THE US AIR FORCES) ON CAPABILITY, READINESS, AND PERHAPS ON THE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE NGA. IT IS IMPRACTICABLE, HOWEVER, WITHOUT FULL INFORMATION ON ORGANISATION, MANNING LEVELS, AND MAINTENANCE ARRANGEMENTS TO QUANTIFY THE EFFECTS.

11. IF ALL SOVIET REDUCTIONS WERE APPLIED TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SOVIET WITHDRAWLS REQUIRED (USING NATO DATA) WOULD BE 81,600. OF THESE, 71,800 WOULD APPLY TO GROUND FORCES. THE ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWALS, DERIVING FROM INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER, AMOUNTING TO 9,750, APPROACHING THE MANPOWER EQUIVALENT OF ONE DIVISION. SUCH A FURTHER REDUCTION OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE ALLIED AIM OF REDUCING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES, AT NO ADDITIONAL COST IN GROUND RECUTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE.

12. THE US PROPOSAL, WITH RESPECT TO PHASE I, WOULD HAVE THESE ADDITIONAL EFFECTS AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY (68,000 MEN, 1,700 TANKS) WOULD BE MAINTAINED. THE RECIPROCAL US REDUCTIONS WULD BE EFFECTED FOR GROUND FORCES, AS CURRENTLY ENVISAGED, BY A THIN-OUT OF US MANPOWER. ADDITIONALLY, US AIR MANPOWER COULD BE REDUCED TO AN EXTENT NOT EXCEEDING 15PERCENT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET ARMOURED GROUND FORCES.

B. THE REDUCTIONS, SYMMETRICAL IN PERCENTAGE TERMS,

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WOULD BE UNEQUAL IN NUMERICAL TERMS.

C. THE CURRENT ALLIED PROPOSAL (NAC 2948 220945Z NOV 73)

FOR PHASE I REQUIRES THE USSR TO WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF FIVE DIVISIONS. THIS WOULD BE ABOUT 15PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SOVIET GROUND FORCES OF 460,000 IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALSO WITHDRAW ABOUT 15PERCENT OF ITS TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF 193,000 SOLDIERS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, I.E. ABOUT 29,000 SOLDIERS. THE NEW US PROPOSAL OF JAN 15 WOULD MAINTAIN THE SAME PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS FOR GROUND FORCES: IT WOULD INCREASE THE REQUIRED REDUCTIONS FOR BOTH US AND USSR BY 15PERCENT OF THE MANPOWER STRENGTH OF THE US AND USSR AIR FORCES IN THE AREA: IT WOULD ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO APPLY THAT INCREASE IN REDUCTIONS TO EITHER GROUND OR AIR MANPOWER.

D. THE CURRENT ALLIED PROPOSAL (NAC 2948), WHICH ADDRESSES ONLY GROUND FORCES FOR REDUCTIONS, COULD NECESSITATE DEFINITION OF "GROUND FORCES" BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENT PRACTICES ADOPTED BY NATO, THE WP, AND INDIVIDUAL NATIONS IN ALLOCATING TASKS (E.G. AREA AIR DEFENCE) TO GROUND AND AIR FORCES. SINCE THE US PROPOSAL IMPOSES NO SUB-CEILINGS ON AIR OR GROUND MANPOWER (ONLY A CEILING ON COMBINED AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER), IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY TO ADDRESS ANOMALIES AND TO DEFINE GROUND AND AIR FORCES, OTHER THAN BY UNIFORM. SUCH FORCES AS THE NATO AIR FORCE MANNED SAM AND THE CSSR AND POLISH AREA AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE COMBINED COUNT OF AIR PLUS GROUND MANPOWER.

E. VERIFICATION CIVILIANISATION AND CIRCUMVENTION. (THIS SECTION IS STILL IN PREPARATION.)

NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO PHASE II

13. THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF THE US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REMAINING REDUCTIONS TOWARDS THE COMMON CEILING ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE AMOUNT OF PERSONNEL (AIR PLUS GROUND) THAT EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE TO ARRIVE AT AN ILLUSTRATIVE OVERALL COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 IS AS FOLLOWS:

NATO	WP
TOTAL (AIR PLUS GROUND) 986,000	TOTAL (AIR PLUS GROUND) 1,145,000
- 900,000	-900,000
OVERALL REQUIRED REDUCTIONS EQUALS 86,000	245,000

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B. THE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL (AIR PLUS GROUND) REMAINING
TO BE REDUCED AFTER COMPLETION OF PHSE I REDUCTINS; IN ORDER TO
REACH A COMMON CEILING AT THE ILLUSTRATIVE LEVEL OF 900,000 ARE:

	NATO	WP
OVERALL REQUIRED REDUCTIONS	86,000	245,000
PHASE I REDUCTIONS	- 34,050	-81,600
	51,950	163,400

C. THE VOLUNTARY CHARACTER OF AIR REDUCTIONS
BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TAKES ACCOUNT, INTER ALIA, THAT SOME
ALLIED NATIONS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO THE EFFECT OF
AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FOR THEIR OWN AIR FORCES. THE FOLLOWING
TABLE ILLUSTRATES THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES OF NATO GROUND
FORCES (INCLUDING US PHASE I REDUCTIONS) THAT WOULD BE REDUCED
TO MEET THE ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 IF THE US
WERE TO REDUCE 5, 10 OR 15PERCENT OF ITS AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I (IF
THERE WERE TO BE NOR FUTHER AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS):

REQUIRED NATO GROUND REDUCTIONS

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PHASE I AIR CUT	NUMBERS	PERCENTAGE
5 PERCENT	84,300 (86,000-1,700)	10.7PERCENT(84,300DIVI- DED 790,000)

10 PERCENT	82,600 (86,000-3,400)	10.6PERCENT (82,600 DIVIDED 790,000)
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15 PERCENT	80,900 (86,000-5,100)	10.2PERCENT (80,900 DIVIDED 790,000)
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D. THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF WP GROUND FORCES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED TO MEET THE ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 COULD VARY BETWEEN A MAXIMUM OF 245,000 (26.1PERCENT)-WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD REDUCED NO AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I - TO A MINIMUM OF 235,250 (25.1PERCENT)-WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD RECUCED 15PERCENT (9,750) OF THEIR AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I.

E. THE NATO GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL (84,300 OR 10.7PERCENT ASSUMING A MINIMUM 5PERCENT REDUCTION OF US AIR MANPOWER) ARE HIGHER (BY APPROX. 7,000) THAN THOSE ENVISAGED IN THE ORIGINAL ALLIED PROPOSAL (1) AIMED AT A COMMON CEILING OF 700,000 THEY WOULD BE LOWER (BY APPROX. 6,000) THAN THOSE POSTULATED IN REDUCTIONS FROM AGREED NATO GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS

(1) C-M(73)83(FINAL), 18 OCT 73

(AT END 74) OF 790,000, TO A CEILING AT 700,000. (THE MORE FAVOURABLE RESULT FOR NATO IS LARGELY DUE TO THE FACT THAT, ALTHOUGH THE NATO AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS 196,000, THE ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING HAS BEEN RAISED BY 200,000 TO 900,000.)

OTHER MILITARY/TECHNICAL EFFECTS WITH RESPECT TO PHASE II

14. FOR EASE IN FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION IN THIS SECTION, EXISTING AND RESIDUAL (AFTER US PROPOSED PHASE I REDUCTIONS) NATO AND WP MANPOWER STRENGTHS IN THE NGA ARE AS SHOWN.

	NATO	WP
EXISTING ASSESSED STRENGTH	986,000	1,145,000
COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE	900,000	900,000
GROUND FORCES, EXISTING	790,000	937,000
RESIDUAL GROUND FORCES, IF ALL REDUCTIONS BORNE BY THEM	704,000	692,000

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RESIDUAL GROUND FORCES, IF AIR MANPOWER BEARS RECUTIONS OF 15PERCENT	733,000	723,000
AIR FORCES, EXISTING	196,000	208,000
RESIDUAL AIR FORCES, IF AIR BEARS REDUCTIONS OF 15PERCENT	167,000	177,000

15. FOR THE GROUND FORCES, WHETHER NIL OR MAXIMUM 15PERCENT AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WERE TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES, THERE WOULD BE A MARKED REDUCTION IN THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTHS OF THE NATO AND WP FORCES. IF FULL REDUCTIONS WERE TAKEN BY THE GROUND FORCES OF BOTH SIDES, OR IF THE REDUCTIONS WERE TAKEN IN AIR MANPOWER UP TO 15PERCENT FOR BOTH SIDES, THE RESULTANT GROUND MANPOWER FIGURES WOULD FALL WITHIN 12,000 MAXIMUM RANGE OF DISPARITY: CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF RESIDUAL GROUND MANPOWER STRENGTHS IN THE RANGE 700,000-730,000 FOR BOTH SIDES. THIS DIFFERENCE WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT IN MILITARY TERMS.

16. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL ON GROUND FORCES IN COMPARISON TO EXISTING NATO PROPOSALS FOLLOW:

A. FOR NATO GROUND FORCES, THE RESULTS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE ENVISAGED IN THE ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL(1). IF THE FULL SCALE REDUCTIONS WERE BORNE BY THE ALLIED GROUND FORCES, THE RESIDUAL GROUND FORCE AT 704,000 WOULD BE SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN THE 700,000 DERIVING FROM THE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL(1). THE PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN ALLIED GROUND FORCES WOULD BE 11PERCENT. TO THE EXTENT THAT ANY AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ARE EFFECTED BY ALLIED FORCES, THE ALLIED RESIDUAL GROUND FORCE WOULD RISE CORRESPONDINGLY ABOVE THE 704,000 FIGURE, TO A MAXIMUM OF 733,000 AT A HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTION OF 15PERCENT.

B. FOR WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES, THE EFFECTS WOULD ALSO BE BROADLY SIMILAR TO THOSE ENVISAGED IN THE ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. A COMBINED (GROUND AND AIR) COMMON CEILING AT 900,000 COULD INVOLVE WP REDUCTION OF GROUND MANPOWER TO 692,000, RETAINING THE PRESENT ASSESSED WP AIR MANPOWER STRENGTH AT 208,000. TO THE EXTENT THAT WP NATIONS CHOSE TO TAKE REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER, THE RESIDUAL GROUND FORCE WOULD BE INCREASED UP TO A MAXIMUM OF 723,000 IF A HYPOTHETICAL LIMIT OF 15PERCENT IS PLACED ON SUCH AIR REDUCTIONS.

C. THE EXISTING PROPOSALS (1)(2)(3) BY THE ALLIES REQUIRE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY (OF ABOUT 68,000 MEN AND INCLUDING 1,700 TANKS) IN PHASE I. NONE OF THE
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PROPOSALS IS SPECIFIC AS TO THE FORM AND NATIONAL ALLOCATION OF WARSAW PACT (OR NATO) REDUCTIONS IN THE LATER PHASE LEADING TO A COMMON CEILING. IT IS HOWEVER, ENVISAGED THAT FURTHER WITHDRAWALS OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD BE REQUIRED.

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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17. THE ADDITIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF THE WARSAW
PACT, POST-PHASE I, COULD BE ABOUT 163,000. IT IS PROBABLE

(1) NAC 2948

(2) C-M(73)83(FINAL), 18 OCT 73

(3) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/75-3

THAT AT LEAST 130,000 OF THESE WOULD FALL ON THE GROUND FORCES.
REDUCTIONS ON THIS SCALE COULD NOT BE ABOSRBED BY THIN-OUT,
EXCEPT AT THE COST OF A VERY SUBSTANTIAL DEGRADATION OF TRAINING
AND FORCE EFFICIENCY AND READINESS. IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE
SOVIET REDUCTION PROPOSAL OF 26 NOV 73 ENVISAGED RECUTIONS (AT
ABOUT 17PERCENT LEVEL- 159,000 TOTAL FOR ALL WP GROUND FORCE REDUC-
TIONS ON NATO ASSESSED FIGURES) IN TERMS OF UNITS AND SUB-UNITS
WITH THEIR ASSOCIATED ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT. THE TOTAL WP
REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED IN THE US PROPOSAL OF 15 JAN 75, AMOUNT TO
245,000: IT THE REDUCTIONS APPLIED TO AIR MANPOWER AMOUNTED TO
15PERCENT, THIS WOULD ENTAIL REDUCTION OF 214,000 WP GROUND FORCES -
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23PERCENT. THIS REPRESENTS THE MANPOWER EQUIVALENT OF ABOUT
20 DIVISIONS.

IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT A TOTAL OF 20

DIVISIONS NEED BE REDUCED TO MAKE A MANPOWER REDUCTION OF 214,000
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT HOW, IF THEY ACCEPTED THE MANPOWER
PROPOSALS, THE WARSAW PACT WOULD EFFECT THEREDUCTIONS IN PHASE II.

18. THE END RESULT, HOWEVER, IF ACHIEVED AS ENVISAGED, WOULD
ENTAIL A WITHDRAWAL OF 5-6 SOVIET DIVISIONS IN PHASE I, COUPLED
WITH FURTHER WITHDRAWALS/REDUCTIONS EITHER OF UNITS OR OF
PERSONNEL IN PHASE II. THE USSR ELEMENTS WITHDRAWN COULD REMAIN
IN BEING IN SOVIET TERRITORY AND CONTINUE TO OFFER A POTENTIAL
THREAT. A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE ALLIES - APPROXIMATE PARITY
IN GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA IN TERMS OF MANPOWER - WOULD HAVE BEEN
ATTAINED.

19. THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, FOR
THE WP POST-PHASE I, CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED IN GENERAL TERMS. A
VARIETY OF MEANS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO THE WP (AS TO NATO) TO
MITIGATE THE DIRECT OPERATION AL EFFECTS OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS:
E.G.CIVILIANISATION, CHANGE OF MAINTENANCE ARRANGEMENTS: RECOURSE
OR CONTRACT SUPPORT IN LIEU OF SERVICE LABOUR. AS STATED IN
RESPECT OF THE SOVIET AIR FORCE, SUCH AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS
OF SAY 5PERCENT WOULD PROBABLY BEAR DIRECTLY ON FRONT-LINE AIRCRAFT
STRENGTH OR READINESS OR BOTH, BUT THE EFFECTS CANNOT BE
QUANTIFIED.

20. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE MANNER IN WHICH
THE WP MIGHT WISH TO EFFECT PHASE II RECUTIONS.

THE WP HAS SUBSTANTITALLY ORE AIRCRAFT THAN
THE ALLIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, DUE LARGELY TO THE HIGH
PROPORTION AND NUMBER(2,494)(81) OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WITH AN
AIR DEFENCE AND ATTACK CAPABILITY. THE NUMBERS OF OFFENSIVE
AIRCRAFT ARE NOT SO DISPARATE(1,084)(1). PERSISTENT DEMANDS
OF THE EAST FOR REDUCTIONS IN NATO AIR FORCES WOULD INDICATE THAT
THE EAST PERCEIVE THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE AIRCRAFT AS THE MAJOR,
IF NOT PRIMARY THREAT TO THEM. IF THIS IS TRUE, THE EAST MAY
BE UNWILLING TO REDUCE THEIR DEFENSEIVE FIGHER SCREEN TO ANY
SIGNIFICANT EXTENT, EXCEPT IN TERMS OF AN OVERALL SYMMETRICAL
TRADE AS ENVISAGED IN THE WP REDUCTION PROPOSAL OF 26 NOV 73.

A REDUCTION IN WP OFFENSIVE

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AIR WOULD REDUCE WP CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT A GROUND ATTACK; A
REDUCTION IN WP AIR DEFENCE UNITS COULD INCREASE THE WP'S
PERCEPTION OF THE NATO THREAT. WITH RESPECT TO GROUND FORCES,

(1) THE FIGURES ARE EXTRACTED FROM AOBAC OF 15TH SEPT, 1974
AND SHOW WP AIR FORCES IN CSSR, GDR AND POLAND. THE NUMBER
OF 2,494 AIR DEFENCE FIGHTERS INCLUDES A RELATIVELY HIGH
NUMBER OF A/C WITH BOTH AN AIR DEFENCE AND A GROUND ATTACK
ROLE. THE PORTION OF THESE DUAL ROLE A/C WILL FURTHER

INCREASE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW FISHBED VERSIONS
J/K/L. THE NUMBER OF 1,084 GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT COMPRISES
ALL CONDITIONAL AND DUAL CAPABLE FIGHTER BOMBERS AND
EXCLUDES A NUMBER OF 441 RECONNAISSANCE A/C.

THE WEST HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT DISPARITIES
FAVOUR THE EAST AND THAT THIS DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES
CONSTITUTES THE PRIMARY THREAT TO NATO SECURITY. THE
EAST HAS NOT DENIED THAT THIS DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES
EXISTS, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THAT THE DISPARITY
IS NOT AS LARGE AS THE WEST BELIEVES. WHILE SOME MILITARY
ADVANTAGE MIGHT ACCRUE TO NATO IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT
THE EAST ELECTED TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE II, SUCH
ADVANTAGE WOULD BE MORE THAN OFFSET BY THE MILITARY
ADVANTAGE TO NATO IF ALL WP PHASE II REDUCTIONS ARE TAKEN
IN GROUND MANPOWER.
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